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Monday, 02 November 2009, 12:16

S E C R E T GENEVA 000936

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA

DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24

CIA FOR WINPAC

JCS FOR J5/DDGSA

SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP

NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP

AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP

DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR

NSC FOR LOOK

DIA FOR LEA

EO 12958 DECL: 11/02/2019

TAGS KACT, MARR, PARM, PREL, RS, US, START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 22, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0626 (SFO-GVA-III-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-012.

2. (U) Meeting Date: October 22, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (S) At the plenary meeting on October 22, chaired by U.S. Negotiator Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Russian Negotiator Ambassador Ant
4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments: Ratification Warm-up and Other Areas of U.S.-Russian Cooperation; U.S. Presentation on Strategic Mis

OPENING COMMENTS: RATIFICATION WARM-UP AND OTHER AREAS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION

5. (S) Antonov began the meeting and noted the contrast between the calm, professional approach to the SFO negotiations in Geneva and the incr
6. (S) Antonov noted that the delegations were engaged more each day in Geneva on key issues, and that by the end of this round the delegator
7. (S) Gottemoeller characterized the activities in Washington as a warm-up for the ratification debate. There
would be continuing interest regarding the SFO Treaty, although this would actually be the first phase of a two-part debate. Debate on CTBT rat
8. (S) Changing subjects, Gottemoeller noted news reports from the previous day, including the news from Vienna on the proposal for Iran to pr
9. (S) Antonov agreed and noted, in particular, that once the United States finalized the 123 Agreement, there would be much more effective cc
10. (S) Gottemoeller acknowledged Antonov's point regarding the Australia Group, and shared her belief that the 123 Agreement would indeed be

U.S. PRESENTATION ON STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN A NON-NUCLEAR CIBFUGURATION

11. (S) Gottemoeller turned to the issue of strategic ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. She noted that she hoped to explore t
12. (S) Mr. Elliott delivered the following points, in response to the July 22, 2009 Russian paper entitled "Proposals of the Russian Side for
Begin points:
- The United States is considering the development and deployment of ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. However, no decision ha
- Recent threats against the United States and its Allies cannot be ignored, nor can they be addressed solely with existing precision-guided, c
- Bearing in mind the U.S. Government has made no decision to develop or deploy ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration, and acknowle
- The Russian side has also raised the issue of the potential "nuclear ambiguity" associated with an attack carried out with non-nuclear armed
- An exhaustive National Academy of Sciences study of these systems completed in 2008 concluded that while the issue of warhead ambiguity durin
notification and transparency mechanisms as the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), would be able
- The National Academy of Sciences also concluded that, although it would be impossible to distinguish a conventionally-armed ballistic missile
- The Academy further concluded that steps could be taken to notify the Russian Government in advance of an impending strike via the U.S./Russi
- The Russian side's non-paper raised the prospect of a scenario in which ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration could supplant nuclear
- The U.S. side has sought to make clear via the repeated statements of successive U.S. Presidents that Russia is no longer considered to be an
- This negotiation is set in a geopolitical context wherein the national security concerns of each country are not perfectly aligned and theref
End points.

FAMILIAR RUSSIAN ARGUMENTS

13. (S) The Russian Delegation had a number of comments and questions in response to the points that Elliott delivered, which made clear Russi
14. (S) The U.S. Delegation responded by making the following points:
- Russia would be engaged throughout the U.S. decision-making process, and there would be no surprises with regard to U.S. plans. If these syst
- A decision to employ conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs would be made by the President, and the same types of command and control procedures
- Regarding the possibility that U.S. development and deployment of conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missiles would result in an interr
End points.

NEWER ELEMENTS OF INTEREST AND CONCERN

15. (S) The U.S. and Russian Delegations discussed some newer aspects of Russian concerns. These included the significance Russia placed on cc
- Consultation with Russia. Antonov was especially concerned that the United States would make a decision regarding the deployment of non-nucle
- Scenarios for Employment. The Russian Delegation raised questions about international law and the basis for employing strategic offensive arm
- Transparency and Use of the JDEC. Colonel Ilin commented that, while the United States had suggested the JDEC could be used for tracking a U.
- Use of Multiple Missiles. General Poznihir suggested that use of a single conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missile would be ineffecti
conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missile, Russian systems would detect the launch and pre-notification would enable Russia to react app
- Decision Process for Development. The Russian Delegation questioned the decision process for developing and deploying conventional ICBMs and
- Long-Term Implications for Nuclear Forces. General Orlov asked about the integration of conventional and nuclear forces, and how this would i
- U.S. National Academy of Sciences Study. The Russian Delegation asked about the studies that had informed U.S. thinking and, in particular, a

16. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

17. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Lt Col Goodman

Mr. McConnell Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov Col Ilin Mr. Artem'yev Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev

18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS